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Abstract
Previous studies that analysed loan defaults have imposed the restrictive assumption that 
the factors which influence the probability of loan default and the rate of default are the same 
and with the same direction effects. This study introduces a two-stage approach by applying 
the double hurdle model to analyse probability of loan default and the magnitude of the 
default as a way of relaxing this restrictive assumption. Using the model, this study is able to 
isolate the determinants of default rate from the determinants of the probability of default. 
The control function approach is used to test and control for potential endogeneity of loan 
amount and profit in the probability of default equation. The model is applied to primary data 
from a survey of 200 small scale entrepreneurs in the Upper West Region of Ghana. Results 
show that enterprise size, interest rate, loan duration, level of profit and loan amount are the 
simultaneous determinants of probability and rate of default. The study recommends that 
the National Board for Small Scale Industries should intensify training programmes aimed at 
enhancing the managerial and technical capabilities of entrepreneurs to ensure healthy and 
productive management to promote enterprise growth and increase profit margins and hence 
reduce defaults.
Keywords: Repayment, Default, Microfinance, Small Scale Enterprises, Endogeneity, Double 
Hurdle
  GJDS, Vol. 14, No. 1, May, 2017 | 147
Benjamin Musah Abu, Paul Bata Domanban and Haruna Issahaku
Microcredit Loan Repayment Default among Small Scale Enterprises: A Double Hurdle Approach
Introduction
Credit risk management is crucial to the survival of banks, microfinance institutions 
and related financial institutions, and the clients they serve. Credit risk can be analysed 
from three main angles: (1) the likelihood of default, (2) the loss given default –defined 
as one minus the recovery rate in the event of default, and (3) the degree of exposure 
in the event of default. The bulk of the empirical literature has focused on modelling 
the probability of default while little attention has been paid to modelling recovery rate 
and its relationship with default (Altman, Resti & Sironi, 2004). Recently, there is a new 
wave of research on recovery rates and its link with the probability of default. This new 
research effort notwithstanding, there are still some unresolved issues. First, it is still 
unclear whether the probability of default and the recovery rate are interdependent or 
independent (see McQuown, 1997; Wilson, 1998). The first set of literature which took 
root in the 1990s is based on the assumption that default probability and recovery rate 
are independent. Studies based on this assumption model recovery rate either as a 
constant term or as a stochastic variable separate from the probability of default. The 
stochasticity of the recovery rate implies that its volatility constitutes idiosyncratic risk 
which can be eliminated through proper portfolio diversification.
In contrast, the second set of literature holds that the recovery rate is related to the 
probability of default and that the correlation between the two is negative (see Frye, 
2000; Jarrow, 2001; Altman, Brady, Resti & Sironi, 2005). The argument is that at the 
macro level both variables depend on the state of the economy (systematic risk). At the 
micro level the relationship between the two is derived from the demand and supply 
of defaulted securities. This argument suggests that, like default, recovery rate has a 
systematic risk component and should therefore attract a risk premium and sufficiently 
incorporated into credit risk assessments.
Second, the modelling of credit risk has been done mainly using large firms from 
advanced countries. The empirical literature on credit risk modelling among small scale 
industries and in the developing world on the subject is rather sparse. There are several 
reasons why credit risk may not be uniform across firms of different sizes operating 
in different environments. In the first place, unlike small scale enterprises, large 
corporations can issue bonds and obtain other sources of funding such as bank loans 
to manage their funding difficulties and credit risk. Also, small scale enterprises often 
either lack collateral or possess collateral of low quality which exacerbates their recovery 
difficulties. Thirdly, the differences in ownership characteristics between corporates and 
small scale enterprises yield different agency costs which could result in different credit 
risk outcomes. Lastly, the institutional, political and economic calculus differ between 
advanced and developing economies and are sufficient reasons why studies done in 
developed country contexts would be far removed from developing country realities.
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Another problem with the extant literature on credit risk modelling of recovery rates 
is the dominance of practitioner literature. The scanty academic literature on recovery 
rates are either case studies or lump bonds and loans together in a unitary sample 
(Khieu, Mullineaux & Yi, 2012). Khieu et al. (2012) argue that given the differences 
between loans and bonds in terms of securitisation (bank loans are more secured than 
bonds), it should be expected that different factors determine recovery rates in the 
two market segments. In the scheme of capital structure, bank loans have a first claim 
to the liquidation value of the firm before bondholders. This implies that defaults on 
bank loans will be lower than on bonds. This study focuses on loans since small scale 
enterprises in developing countries mostly do not even have the capacity to issue bonds.
This study makes a two-fold contribution to the literature. The first contribution is 
methodological, applying a two-step approach to analyse probability of default and rate 
of default. So far, no study has carried out analysis using this two-step procedure where 
loan repayment default is modelled in the first stage to determine the factors influencing 
probability of default and modelled in the second stage to determine factors influencing 
the quantum (rate) of default. This novel approach helps overcome endogeneity and 
reverse causality (both common) in one stage models. The one stage approach of 
either analysing probability of default or determinants of rate of default imposes an 
assumption which would be explored in the literature review section. Second, this study 
joins the few empirical studies (e.g., Kosak & Poljsak, 2010; McCann & McIndoe-Calder, 
2012; Menton & Sherman, 2014) that apply recovery rate modelling to SSEs. However, 
this study departs significantly from these studies in the methodology employed as 
afore-mentioned. Most studies (see Awunyo-Vitor, 2012; Wongnaa and Awunyo-Vitor, 
2013; Anigbogu, Onuga, Onyeugbo & Okoli, 2014) also concentrate on individual or 
household characteristics other than enterprise characteristics. This study uses both 
enterprise level characteristics and household level characteristics.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. The review of related literature 
immediately follows. After the literature review, the methodology is presented next. 
Presentation and discussion of results follows the methodology. Finally, conclusion and 
policy implications are presented.
Literature Review
There is considerable literature on credit risks of financial institutions. In general, a 
review and summary of the numerous credit risk studies show that studies related 
to recovery rate are evolving unlike those of probability of default where extensive 
work has been done (see Grunert & Weber, 2009; Khieu et al., 2012; Bastos, 2010; Bade, 
Rosch & Scheule, 2011). For example, Bastos (2010) notes that the recent attention on 
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recovery rates was triggered by the advent of the new Basel Capital Accord. Also, most 
of the studies in recovery rates are skewed towards bond recovery rates rather than loan 
recovery (Khieu et al., 2012; Bastos, 2010; Dermine & Neto de Carvalho, 2006).
On the theoretical front, there are two schools of thought on the relationship between 
probability of default and recovery rate. While Frye (2000), Altman et al. (2005), and 
Bruche and González-Aguado (2010) argue that probability of default and recovery 
rate are correlated, Grunert and Weber (2009), and Jarrow, Lando and Turnbull (1997) 
show that the two are uncorrelated. The theorists of correlated probability of default 
and recovery rates posit a negative correlation between the two. The implication of 
correlation is that, modelling probability of default and recovery rate as standalone 
models would yield biased estimates (Bade et al., 2011; Bruche & González-Aguado, 
2010). Another notable issue in the literature is the rigorous application of traditional 
multivariate statistical and econometric models (Lin, 2009). The prominent ones 
include multivariate discriminant analysis, logit, probit, non-parametric models such as 
mathematical programming, classification trees and neural networks.
In terms of the empirics, Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (1998) and Bonfim (2009) 
explore a link between banking crisis and macroeconomic developments of countries. 
They observe that banking crisis is more likely to occur in a weak macroeconomic 
environment. Authors such as Pederzoli and Torricelli (2005), and Jimenez and Saurina 
(2004), offer explanations supporting the findings of Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache 
(1998) and Bonfim (2009). They note that high default rates during recessions are 
consequences of unsustainable and risky transactions pursued during periods of 
expansions. In contrast to these macroeconomic-based findings, the results of Johnson, 
Boone, Breach and Friedman (2000) show the superiority of corporate governance over 
macroeconomic measures as a predictor of banking crisis. They observe that in countries 
with weak corporate governance, financial distress problems are more likely to emerge.
Methodologically, two options have been identified in the loan repayment default 
literature. The first option is where repayment default is modelled as a discrete outcome. 
That is, either a client defaults or not. In these studies, categorical (binary) choice models 
such as probit and logit are employed for analyses (see, for instance, Awunyo-Vitor, 
2012; Mokhtar, Natea & Gan, 2012). The second option is where repayment or default is 
modelled as a continuous outcome. That is, the amount of repayment default (given as 
the difference between amount of loan, including interest, and the amount paid within 
the stipulated time). In these cases, multiple regression, test of means, chi-square, Tobit 
and discriminant analysis are used (see, for instance, Sharma & Zeller, 1997; Eze & 
Ibekwe, 2007; Oladeebo & Oladeebo, 2008; Munene & Guyo, 2013; Anigbogu et al., 2014).
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In using these approaches, which can be regarded as one step approaches, one 
methodological issue arises. The assumption that the same set of factors determines 
probability of repayment or default on one hand and amount of repayment or default 
on the other is implied. The problem with this assumption is that, it is possible that 
a variable could have different effects on the probability and rate of default. The 
assumption is restrictive and hence, makes the one step approach restrictive. This study 
proposes the use of a two-stage approach as a means of overcoming the restrictiveness of 
the one step approach. The benefit of using this two-step procedure thus, is the ability to 
account for the factors influencing the probability of default and the amount of default 
separately but in a simultaneous manner.
Analytical Method
Empirical Model and Choice of Econometric Model
In modelling repayment default with a two-step approach, two dependent variables 
are identified. Whether a loan beneficiary was able to fully pay back the loan or not 
represents the dependent variable for the first stage model and the rate of default if 
the beneficiary was not able to fully pay back represents the dependent variable for the 
second stage model. Thus, the first step is the usual approach in the literature where this 
study estimates the probability of loan default using the discrete approach. The second 
step is estimating the factors that determine the level (amount) of loan default using the 
continuous approach.
Given a typical small scale entrepreneur who benefitted from microcredit, , for a period 
of time, , at an interest rate, , the simple interest payable at the end of the period 
would be expressed as:
         (1)
Total amount to be repaid,  is the sum of loan amount,  and interest, . At the end 
of the loan period, , with amount of repayment, , the following mutually exclusive 
scenarios can occur:
          (2a)
        (2b)
where  is a period of at least 1 day after the last stated repayment date. This implies 
that the operational definition of default is a loan that was delinquent for at least 1 day 
after the stated duration. It should be noted that within the period of the loan, a client 
could default in a particular day, week, fortnight or month depending on the repayment 
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schedule. This default is not what is defined here. It is the default at the end of the entire 
loan duration which is defined.
The rate of repayment,  from these scenarios would be defined by:
        (3)
The default rate,  from scenario (2a) would be defined by:
        (4)
While the default rate in scenario (2b) will be defined by:
        (5)
where  is nonnegative and not zero ( ).
Equations (2a) and (2b) define the discrete dependent variable in the first stage and 
equation (5) defines the continuous dependent variable in the second stage. If a single 
variable for (2a) and (2b), , is defined, then, the study seeks to model:
      (6)
         (7)
where equations (6) and (7) are loan default and rate of default models respectively;  
assumes the value of 1 if an individual defaults and 0 otherwise.  is rate of default and 
 and  are the vectors of explanatory variables hypothesised to influence probability 
of loan default and rate of default respectively. These variables are explained in the next 
section.  and  are the parameters to be estimated and  and .
Departing from these previous studies into the realm of two-step approach, the model 
to tackle the issue under consideration also changes. An important issue worthy 
of mention is the fact that rate of default is only observed for a subset of the sampled 
population (those with scenario of equation (2b)) because enterprises with scenario (2a) 
would have zero rates of default. This introduces selection bias as indicated by Heckman 
(1979). As s a consequence, estimates of equations (6) and (7) based on least squares 
would be biased and inconsistent (Greene, 2003). There are a number of alternatives to 
address the selectivity bias and provide unbiased, consistent and efficient estimates. 
The first is the widely used Tobit model (proposed by Tobin, 1958) developed to alleviate 
the problems caused by least squares. Though the Tobit model is implementable in 
this paper, its imminent restriction (the assumption of variables which determine the 
probability of default also determining the rate of default) makes it unusable. In other 
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words, Tobit would only estimate equation (7) and assume that what determines (7) 
determines (6) with the same magnitude and direction.
The second alternative is to employ the Heckman sample selection model which 
estimates (6) with probit and (7) with least squares after including among the covariates 
the inverse mills ratio (IMR) derived from the probit to account for selection bias. 
Following from the observation of Ricker-Gilbert, Jayne and Chirwa (2011), the 
Heckman model is designed for incidental truncation, where the zeros are unobserved 
values. However, in this paper a zero value in the data would reflect an enterprise’ 
optimal choice rather than a missing value. It would be erroneous to equate these 
missing observations to zero (Olwande & Mathenge, 2012). Therefore, the Heckman 
model is not also used.
The third alternative is the Cragg’s double hurdle model (proposed by Cragg, 1971). It is 
a corner solution model just like the Tobit. The fact that the Tobit and the double hurdle 
models are corner solution models makes them appropriate to this study than the 
Heckman model. Considering the restrictiveness of the Tobit model, the double hurdle 
model is the feasible one adopted. Following Burke (2009), the double hurdle model can 
be specified theoretically as:
 ( , | , )= {1 ( )}( ) ( )(2 )
( )
/ ( / )
( )
       (8)
where  is the standard normal cumulative distribution function and exponential 
indicator functions are 1( =0 ) and . The rest of the variables are as defined 
before. Equation (8) integrates equations (6) and (7) as one model and specifies a probit 
model to determine the probability of default and the truncated normal model for rate 
of default simultaneously using Burke’s (2009) craggit command in Stata. However, 
the parameters of the first and second hurdles can also be estimated using probit and 
truncated normal regression respectively. The double hurdle model is a maximum 
likelihood estimator. The fundamental assumption underlying the model is that 
the errors of the two hurdles are independent, normally distributed and with zero 
covariance. One advantage of the double hurdle is its ability to nest the Tobit model thus 
allowing for the testing of the restrictions implied by the Tobit hypothesis (Burke, 2009; 
Olwande & Mathenge, 2012).
Testing and Controlling for Endogeneity
The choice of the double hurdle model does not in itself guarantee unbiased, consistent 
and efficient estimates if other issues are not taken care of. It is suspected that the 
amount of loan and previous profit is potentially endogenous to the probability and 
rate of default. In as much as several factors cause enterprises to default, the amount of 
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loan is expected to be the prime cause of default and the quantum of the default. High 
interest rates are usually seen as a constraint to loan repayment, but even such interest 
rates work through the amount of loan. Also, from the microfinance institution’s (MFI’s) 
standpoint, the amount of loan given out would depend on the ability to repay which 
is usually referred to as creditworthiness. The implication of this suspicion of amount 
of loan and profit being endogenous is that there may be correlation between the error 
terms in a reduced form equation of loan amount and profit, and and in equations (6) and 
(7) respectively.
To resolve this, the control function (CF) approach is adopted. Generally, the CF involves 
estimating a reduced form function with the suspected endogenous variable(s) 
(loan amount and profit in this case) as the dependent variable(s) and estimating 
the residual(s) of this function for inclusion as covariate(s) in models (6) and (7). 
The significance of the coefficient(s) on the residual(s) both tests and controls for 
endogeneity. However, standard errors associated with the estimated residuals in the 
double hurdle model are no longer valid. We overcome this by bootstrapping standard 
errors for the residuals. The loan amount and profit reduced form models are estimated 
using ordinary least squares (OLS).
One requirement for the use of the CF approach is the introduction of an instrumental 
variable in the loan amount and profit reduced form models that is not in the probability 
and the rate of default models. It is expected that the instrumental variable should be 
correlated with the potentially endogenous variables (loan amount and profit) but 
not correlated with the probability and the rate of default variables. The instrumental 
variable considered is type of enterprise engaged in [ETYPE] which is believed to have 
an influence on loan amount and profit and at the same time has minimal chances of 
correlating with loan default and rate of default. The implication is that ETYPE is 
assumed to be exogenous in the loan default and rate of default models.
Study Area, Data and Variables
The Upper West Region has eleven administrative districts. The study was conducted 
in the Wa Municipality of the Upper West Region which is the only municipality of the 
eleven districts. The population of the municipality stands at 107,214 representing 15.3% 
of the regional total population. It is therefore the largest in terms of population. Out of 
the population figure, 71,051 and 36,163 are urban and rural dwellers respectively.
Primary data were collected from a survey of 200 small scale entrepreneurs using 
structured questionnaires. The survey was conducted between May and July, 2014. 
The first process of the data collection was the listing of beneficiaries of microcredit 
from microfinance institutions who operated SSEs in the municipality. The target 
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population thus comprised beneficiaries who had completed the entire period within 
which the loan was supposed to be paid back. At the time of data collection, some of 
the target population were on fresh loans. These beneficiaries were not part of the 
target population based on the current loans but on the previous loans that had their 
repayment period elapsing. In the process of listing, 497 SSEs were recorded. The second 
process was the application of simple random sampling to the list generated to draw 
respondents. Due to logistical constraints, 200 SSEs (representing about 40% of the 497 
SSEs) were taken as the sample size.
Variables considered are categorised as borrower, enterprise and loan/lender 
characteristics. Borrower characteristics include gender of borrower, age of borrower, 
education of borrower and number of dependents. Gender [GEN] is measured as a 
dummy taking on a value of 1 if a client is male and 0 otherwise. This could have a 
positive or negative effect on probability and rate of default. Age [AGE] is a continuous 
variable measured by number of years of the borrower. This could have a positive or 
negative effect on probability and rate of default. Educational level [EDU] is a continuous 
variable measured by number of completed years of schooling and is expected to 
decrease probability and rate of default. Number of dependents [DEPN] is measured 
by the number of people under the care of the client. The expectation is not certain. 
Enterprise characteristics include age of enterprise, size of enterprise, level of previous 
profit before the loan and type of enterprise. Age of enterprise [EAGE] measures the 
number of years of existence of a client’s enterprise up to the year of the loan. This is 
expected to decrease probability and rate of default. Size of enterprise [ESIZE] measures 
the number of people employed to work in the enterprise in the year of the loan and is 
expected to decrease probability and rate of default.
Profit [PRF] measures profit earned or loss incurred in the year preceding the year of 
loan and is expected to decrease probability and rate of default. Type of enterprise 
operated [ETYPE] is a dummy taking a value of 1 if enterprise is in trading of agricultural 
commodities and 0 otherwise. Given that agriculture is the mainstay of the region, the 
variable seeks to explore how trading in unprocessed agricultural commodities affect 
amount of loan and profit. It is expected to increase loan amount and profit. Loan 
characteristics include interest rate, loan period, repayment schedule and loan amount. 
Interest rate [INTR] measures the rate of interest per annum on loan. This is expected 
to increase probability and rate of default. Loan period [LNPRD] is the duration of loan 
measured in years and is expected to decrease probability and rate of default. Repayment 
schedule [RESCH] is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if repayment is made 
fortnightly and 0 otherwise. Its expectation is not certain. Loan amount [LNAMT] is the 
total amount of money taken as loan and is expected to increase probability and rate of 
default.
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Empirical Results and Discussions
Socio-economic Characteristics of Respondents
Socioeconomic characteristics and other descriptive statistics of respondents are 
presented in Table 1. The mean age of respondents is 38 years. About 54% is male while 
65% is married. Educational status showed that on average respondents spent about 
9 years in school. Average number of dependents of respondents is 4 people. Mean age 
of enterprise is about 9 years while the mean size of enterprise is 5 people. Enterprises 
made an average profit of GH¢108.26 in the preceding year to the loan. Majority (51%) 
of respondents paid back their loans fortnightly. This was followed by those who paid 
on monthly basis (32.5%). Only 1% had a schedule of daily payments while 15.5% had a 
schedule of weekly repayments.
Interest rate averaged 23.3% per annum. This ranged from 11% to 38% per annum. 
Duration of loan repayment ranged from 1 year to 4 years with a mean of about 2 years. 
Agro-processing represents the dominant enterprise run by respondents as 53% are 
engaged in it. This is followed by enterprises in the trading of unprocessed agricultural 
commodities (41.5%). Store operating enterprises (sales of provisions) represent the 
least enterprise (5.5%) engaged in by respondents. The average amount of loan accessed 
was GH¢410.13. Loan amount due ranged from GH¢90 to GH¢1750 with an average of 
GH¢608.61. Amount of loan paid back averaged GH¢570.11 with a minimum of GH¢90 and 
a maximum of GH¢1750.
At the end of the repayment period, 34.5% of respondents defaulted in paying back their 
loans. The rate of repayment ranged from 54.1% to 100% with a mean repayment rate of 
about 94%. On the other hand, rate of default had a minimum of 3.4% and a maximum of 
45.9% with a mean of 18.3%.
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Table 1: Socio-economic characteristics and descriptive statistics of variables
Discrete variables Continuous variables
Variable Freq.
(percent)
Variable Mean Std Dev. Min Max
Loan status
Repaid fully
Defaulted
 131(65.5)
 69(34.5)
Loan amount 410.13 240.42 75 1000
Gender:
Male
Female
 107(53.5)
 93(46.5)
Loan amount due 608.61 376.29 90 1750
Marital status:
Married
Never married
Widow(er)
Divorced
 130(65.0)
 43(21.5)
 19(9.5)
 8(4.0)
Loan amount paid 570.11 363.87 90 1750
Education:
None
Primary
Middle/JHS
SHS
Diploma
Undergraduate
Postgraduate
 39(19.5)
 26(13.0)
 62(31.0)
 28(14.0)
 24(12.0)
 19(9.5)
 2(1.0)
Rate of repayment 93.69 10.94 54.1 100
Rate of default 18.3 11.31 3.38 45.9
Age 37.74 9.06 21 60
Enterprise type:
Agro-processing
Agric. trading
Provision store
 106(53.0)
 83(41.5)
 11(5.5)
Education 8.58 5.40 0 20
Number of 
dependants
4.04 2.75 0 15
Repayment schedule:
Daily
Weekly
Fortnightly
Monthly
 2(1.0)
 31(15.5)
 102(51.0)
 65(32.5)
Age of enterprise 8.51 5.11 1 25
Size of
enterprise
4.5 2.52 1 16
Reason for default:
Wrong investing
Diversion
Unfavourable repay. 
schedule
Insufficient loan
Natural calamity
 16(23.2)
 13(18.8)
 22(31.9)
 9(13.0)
 9(13.0)
Profit
Interest rate
Loan period
108.26
23.31
1.94
306.89
5.14
0.94
-750
11
1
850
38
4
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From the 69 defaulters, 31.9% attributed their default to difficult or unfavourable 
repayment schedule, 23.2% to wrong investment decisions, 18.8% to diversion of loan 
and 13% to insufficient loan and natural calamities apiece.
Determinants of Loan Default and Rate of Default
Table A1 (see appendix) presents the results of the reduced form models of loan amount 
and profit. First of all, the instrument (ETYPE) is highly relevant in both reduced 
form models. As a rule of thumb in the case of a single instrument, the t-value of the 
instrument should be greater than 3.2 or the corresponding p-value below 0.0016. The 
t-values for the instrument in the loan amount and the profit models are respectively 
5.31 and 3.59 with p-value of 0.000 each. For test of exogeneity (see Table A2 in appendix), 
we regressed the instrument on the residuals of loan amount and profit separately. The 
results show that the instrument bears no statistically significant relationship with 
the residuals. This implies that type of enterprise is truly exogenous in relation to the 
probability of default.
The estimates of the probability of loan repayment default and rate of default are 
presented in Table 2. Table 2 has the probability and rate of default model estimates 
through the step-by-step approach and the double hurdle approach. The results show 
that, the standalone probit results and the double hurdle probit results are the same. 
However, the standalone truncated regression and that of the double hurdle are 
different in the parameters of all the variables except for EDU which, in addition to the 
parameter, the signs also differ. Also, while AGE and DEPN are significant determinants 
in the standalone truncated regression, they are not significant in the double hurdle 
estimates. These strengthen the argument of bias of the one-step approach.
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Table 2: Estimates of determinants of loan repayment default and rate of default
Variable
Step-by-step estimates Double hurdle estimates
Probit Regression Truncated Normal 
Regression
Hurdle 1
Probability of Loan 
Default
(Probit Regression)
Hurdle 2
Rate of Default
(Truncated Normal 
Regression)
Coefficient Robust 
std. 
error
Coefficient Robust 
std. 
error
Coefficient Robust 
std. 
error
Coefficient Robust 
std. 
error
GEN 1.2001* 0.6699 -0.3590 1.0037 1.2001* 0.6699 -2.3871 2.3806
AGE 0.0214 0.0561 0.1834*** 0.0570 0.0214 0.0561 0.1041 0.1224
EDU -0.2663** 0.1058 -0.0392 0.0900 -0.2663** 0.1058 0.0980 0.1829
DEPN 0.5959*** 0.1821 -0.3585** 0.1509 0.5959*** 0.1821 -0.5161 0.4559
EAGE -0.0192 0.1575 -0.5234*** 0.0928 -0.0192 0.1575 -0.7564** 0.3585
ESIZE -1.2957*** 0.2482 -0.8218*** 0.1914 -1.2957*** 0.2482 -2.1830*** 0.7302
INTR 0.1852*** 0.0712 0.9732*** 0.1494 0.1852*** 0.0712 2.1069*** 0.2229
LNPRD -3.1848*** 1.1678 -1.2572** 0.4938 -3.1848*** 1.1678 -3.3501*** 1.2556
RESCH -2.5210*** 0.8859 -0.5551 0.9107 -2.5210*** 0.8859 -1.3912 1.8483
PRF -0.0705*** 0.0214 -0.0117*** 0.0022 -0.0705*** 0.0214 -0.0095*** 0.0037
LNAMT 0.0609*** 0.0199 0.0064*** 0.0024 0.0609*** 0.0199 0.0184*** 0.0050
LNAMT_res -0.0544*** 0.0187 -0.0544*** 0.0062
PRF_res 0.0579*** 0.0179 0.0579*** 0.0050
CONSTANT -13.2149*** 4.4221 -11.7801*** 3.7451 -13.2149*** 4.4221 -31.6884*** 6.8065
Sigma 6.2950*** 0.4342 6.8766*** 0.7714
No. of 
observations
Wald chi2
Log pseudo 
likelihood
200
84.81***
-10.5469
69
242.42***
-651.7376
200  69
84.81***
-230.5690
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05 and *p < 0.10. The standard errors of the residuals (LNAMT_res and PRF_res) in the double 
hurdle results are bootstrapped at 150 repetitions since the normal standard errors from the estimates are not 
valid.
Source: Regression estimates from survey data, 2014
Generally, the results of the double hurdle model are robust compared with those from 
the step-by-step approach. The discussions of the results are based on the double hurdle 
results since the weakness of the step-by-step approach has been underscored.
The loan amount and profit residuals (LNAMT_res and PRF_res) from the reduced form 
models are statistically significant at 1% implying that loan amount and profit are 
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endogenous in the loan default model. They are not significant in hurdle 2 hence they 
are omitted in the final estimation. The estimates in hurdle 1 show that probability of 
loan repayment default is influenced by gender of client, education level, number of 
dependants, size of enterprise, rate of interest, duration of loan, repayment schedule, 
level of profit and loan amount. Rate of default on the other hand is influenced by age of 
enterprise, size of enterprise, rate of interest, duration of loan, level of profit and loan 
amount.
It is found that males are 120% more likely to default. Men are generally more risk 
loving than women and for that matter can apply loans in very risky ventures which 
may end up failing. Another explanation for this result is that, women are generally 
more skilful at agro-processing and trading and for that matter are less likely to default 
when borrowed funds are applied to these enterprises. This finding also, confirms the 
observations by Abu et al. (2016) that women are relatively more industrious than men 
in the operation of SMEs. Gender does not however determine rate of default.
This confirms the observation of Abu et al. (2016) that women are seen as relatively 
more industrious than men in the operation of SMEs. Trading and agro-processing are 
activities that women are comparatively skilful at and thus may be the reason for this 
finding. Gender does not however determine rate of default.
More educated clients are 26.6% less likely to default. This is consistent with the work of 
Bridges and Disney (2004), and Eze and Ibekwe (2007) who observed that borrowers with 
low level of education have higher risks of debt. The likelihood of managerial differences 
between more educated clients and less educated ones might be responsible for this 
observation. More educated borrowers might have a better economic standing and 
able to make more advantageous financial decisions (Schicks, 2014). Level of education 
however, does not influence rate of default.
Entrepreneurs with more dependents are 59.6% more likely to default. This is consistent 
with a priori expectation. Large dependents may serve as a strain on business expansion 
and growth due to huge consumption expenditures. Thus, huge expenditures stifle 
prompt repayment. Number of dependents does not determine rate of default.
While age of enterprise does not determine probability of default, it is a negative 
determinant of rate of default. Enterprises that have operated for relatively longer years 
record smaller default rates as compared to young enterprises. Specifically, they are 
0.76% less likely to record high default rates. This confirms the finding of Bastos (2010) 
that older firms exhibit better recoveries. This finding endorses the role of experience 
in the prudent management of loans. The findings suggest that even if experienced 
enterprises default, they leverage their vast experience to reduce the rate of default.
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Enterprises with larger number of workers are 129.6% less probable to default in loan 
repayments. This meets a priori expectation. Size is an indicator of the economic muscle 
of an enterprise. Kiboki et al. (2014) view size of enterprise as a performance indicator. 
The argument therefore is that large enterprises have the capacity to efficiently utilise 
loans to derive significant benefits that make them more likely to fully pay back their 
loans than small enterprises. Size of enterprise also negatively influences rate of loan 
default. This implies that enterprises with larger number of workers are 2.2% less likely 
to default with high rates.
The positive estimate of interest rate shows that enterprises that secured loans with 
higher interest rates are more probable of defaulting. Such enterprises are 18.5% more 
likely to default. This observation stresses the role of high interest rate in loan defaults 
and advances the arguments of the effect of high interest rate in stifling enterprise 
development as well as the sustainability of credit institutions. With respect to rate 
of default, interest rate correlates positively with rate of loan default. Clients who had 
higher interest rates are 2.1% more likely to record higher rates. This further indicates 
the effect of interest rate on the quantum of default.
It is observed that enterprises that paid back their loans over longer period of time 
are 318.5% less likely to default. This is highly anticipated since spreading repayment 
over long time periods offers enterprises the opportunity of spreading loan burden 
in a manner that keeps pace with the cash flow of the enterprise. This observation 
agrees with Jimenez and Saurina (2004) who argue that loans with longer durations 
have lower probability of defaults due to the fact that credit institutions do proper and 
thorough examination of the application since the borrower’s financial health could 
change significantly over such a long period. However, Eze and Ibekwe (2007) find that 
borrowers with long durations record more outstanding loan amount. On rate of default, 
duration of loan is estimated as a negative determinant. This means that enterprises 
that paid back their loans over longer period of time record small rates of loan default. 
Such enterprises are 3.4% less likely to record high rates.
The negative estimate of repayment schedule shows that enterprises that make 
repayment fortnightly are 252.1% less likely to default as compared to those who repay 
daily, weekly and monthly. A plausible reason could be that repayment in fortnight 
is an optimal time that favours efficient loan repayment. Probably, daily and weekly 
repayments are too short a time while monthly repayments are too long a time to 
ensure prompt repayments. Daily and weekly schedules are probably strenuous due 
to inadequate cash flow while monthly schedules are problematic due to household 
expenditures. The observation implies that cash flow of enterprises correlate more with 
fortnight repayments than the other repayment periods. Repayment schedule does not 
however influence rate of default.
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It is found that enterprises that make large profits are 7.1% less likely to default in loan 
repayment. The result is consistent with those of Bonfim (2009), Wongnaa and Awunyo-
Vitor (2013), and Oladeebo and Oladeebo (2008). This is highly anticipated since loan 
repayments principally are made from enterprise profits. Therefore, the larger the profit 
the more probable an enterprise is to fully pay loans without defaulting. Also, profit is 
another indicator of an enterprise’s performance and an indicator of repayment ability. 
Hence, more profitable firms should have a more solid financial situation (Bonfim, 2009) 
to enable repayments. In terms of default rate, the level of profit negatively determines 
the rate of default which implies that higher profits induce lower default rates. The larger 
the profit, rate of default is 0.01% smaller.
Amount of loan is a positive determinant of probability of loan repayment default. This 
means that enterprises that secured larger loan amounts are 6.1% more likely to default. 
This is expected since a large amount of loan represents a large cost and responsibility 
for an enterprise to meet. This contradicts the finding of Awunyo-Vitor (2012) and 
Jimenez and Saurina (2004) but confirms the finding of Sharma and Zeller (1997), and 
Eze and Ibekwe (2007). With respect to rate of default, amount of loan is a positive 
determinant. This means that enterprises that secured large amounts of loans record 
large rates of default. Such enterprises record 0.02% more rate of default. Just as such 
enterprises are more likely to default, they default with large rates. This corroborates the 
finding of Dermine and Neto de Carvalho (2006) and Bastos (2010) who observed that 
size of loan negatively influences recovery rate.
Conclusion and Policy Implications
The success stories of MFIs in providing credit to SSEs depend on repayment 
performance. Repayment default is a fundamental bane, crippling and stifling the 
efforts of these microcredit granting institutions. This paper sought to apply a two stage 
approach to analysing probability and magnitude of loan default as a way of avoiding the 
assumption imposed by various studies that, the same factors determine the probability 
and magnitude of default. The control function approach was used to test and control 
for potential endogeneity of loan amount and profit in relation to probability of default. 
In summary, the results showed that enterprise size, interest rate, loan duration, level 
of profit and loan amount are the simultaneous determinants of probability and rate of 
default. However, the age and educational attainment of the enterprise owner, number 
of dependents and loan repayment schedule influence the probability of default but not 
the rate of default.
These findings imply that microfinance institutions must be conversant with the factors 
that influence the probability of defaults separate from those that influence the rate 
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of default. Thus, they would require separate measures to reduce the probability of 
default and the rate of default. From policy perspective, the National Board for Small 
Scale Industries (NBSSI) should intensify training programmes aimed at enhancing the 
managerial and technical capabilities of entrepreneurs to ensure healthy and productive 
management as this would promote enterprise growth and increase profit margins and 
hence reduce defaults. One way to make training programmes proactive is to design 
industry specific programme modules. Also, microfinance institutions should consider 
reviewing repayment periods to suit the peculiarities of each enterprise in order to 
diffuse the burden of repayment. While large loan amounts are problematic, appropriate 
targeting of large enterprises for large amounts could reduce defaults. Furthermore, 
government’s role in ensuring a stable macroeconomic environment that favours 
moderate interest rates cannot be overemphasised.
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